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European energy policy is characterized by a complex allocation of authority between the European 
Union and its Member States which results in an intricate interplay of regulatory competence. 
Knowing the difficulties European countries face in coordinating and proposing common solutions in 
the area of energy, there is the urgent need to question the legal foundations underlying the decision-
making process. Institutional paralysis, low reactivity to events and changes as well as systematic 
political horse-trading across all questions call for an alternative framework allowing some pioneering 
Member States to promote ad hoc common policies escaping the formal and procedural requirements 
of EU law. Our paper assesses the legal feasibility of short-run differentiation by means of partial 
international agreements inspired by the Schengen regime, namely entirely outside the EU framework. 
The key challenge from a legal point of view is to assess the substantive compatibility of such 
agreements in energy with the existing rules of the Union. Short run differentiation in energy cannot 
indeed be assessed at a high level of generalities. We therefore take two areas where legally-binding 
coordination at the sub-Union level is often called for: nuclear policy and gas security of supply. The 
possible substantive content of such cooperation is derived from the economic and political literature 
before legal feasibility is assessed. Our findings suggest that the scope for such agreements is limited 
for security of gas supply whereas it could be an improved cooperation device in certain areas of 
nuclear policy. 
Keywords 





The recent declarations of some prominent European leaders about the necessity to accelerate the 
Europeanization of energy policy have not only demonstrated a new political impetus but also a 
renewed interest for the potentialities and limitations of the current legal basis for decision-making in 
the Union.
1 Using the ‘enhanced cooperation mechanism’ (Art 20 TEU), establishing a new European 
Energy Community Treaty or revamping the old EURATOM Treaty, are only some of the 
propositions which compose the energy policy debate today. Focusing on the substantive content of 
policies is indeed no longer sufficient to achieve the three objectives of competition, sustainability and 
security of supply. There is now a need to address in parallel the institutional and political 
impediments precluding the Union from going forward. 
The risk of institutional paralysis in an increasingly diversified Union with 27 Member States is not 
a particularity of the energy sector. Defence, migration, taxation or foreign policy are all fields where 
the complex allocation of competence between the Union and its Member States and the remaining 
need for unanimity in some parts of EU decision-making continue to limit the Union’s ability to 
implement common solutions. The risk of paralysis in an enlarged Union has been powerfully recalled 
by the French and Irish ‘no’ to the referendum for the adoption of the European Constitution which 
has been paradigmatic of Member States’ reluctance to relinquish part of their sovereignty. Even in 
fields of shared competence where qualified majority voting does apply, low reactivity to events and 
changes as well as systematic political horse-trading across all questions continue to undermine the 
ability of the Union to respond timely and efficiently to the globalization of today’s challenges. 
As demonstrated by the Sector Inquiry of 2007,
2 the completion of a truly integrated single energy 
market remains at best a work-in-progress. For a variety of reasons, Member States have had very 
different views on the advantages of the new market organization. The ten-year negotiation process 
which led to the enactment of the first liberalization directives
3 has already evidenced the difficulties 
of reaching a consensus
4 and many of the problems which would impair the reform process in the next 
period, in particular the lack of a clear legal basis for energy in the EC Treaty. This has changed with 
the Lisbon Treaty and the new Art 194 TFEU. Art 194 TFEU codifies the existing objectives and 
instruments of European energy policy and links them explicitly. Art 194(1) TFEU indeed states that 
“Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: (a) ensure the 
functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote 
energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and 
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.” This new provision could however arguably 
weaken the existing foundations of EU energy policy. It is indeed not unthinkable that a decision of 
the Commission under the competition rules be challenged on the basis of Art 194 TFEU for not 
taking into account security of supply or environmental concerns. In addition, Art 194(2) TFEU 
restates the right of Member States “to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its 
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” and unanimity 
                                                      
1 See e.g. the new Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger during his confirmation hearing 
(http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/oettinger-defends-european-vision-energy/article-188911) or the President of the 
European Parliament Jerzy Busek advocating the creation of a new European Energy Community following the report of 
Jacque Delors’ Think Tank, Notre Europe (speech accessible at http://www.ep-
president.eu/president/view/en/press/speeches/sp-2010/sp-2010-February/speeches-2010-February-4.html.).  
2  DG Competition, Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC(2006) 1724 final of 10.1.2007. 
3  Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, O.J. 30.1.1997, 
L 27/20; Directive 98/30/EC of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, O.J. 
21.7.1998, L 204/1. 
4  Hancher, “Slow and Not So Sure: Europe’s Long March to Electricity Liberalization”, 10(9) Electricity Journal (1997), 
92-101. Nicole Ahner, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque 
2 
over fiscal matters (Art 194(3) TFEU), two areas where EU energy policy has indeed achieved very 
little despite obvious possibilities.   
A logical conclusion from the last ten years of liberalization experience is that the time may have 
come to consider more flexible forms of integration allowing Member States to reach common 
positions in energy to commit on a regional or functional basis. Short-run differentiation at the sub-
Union level has always been a reality of the European integration process and certain well-known 
successes like the Schengen agreement have allowed progress without shaking the constitutional order 
of the Union. History has shown that short-run differentiation can take different forms, both within 
and outside the framework of the Treaties. Within the EU legal order, the European Monetary Union 
has for instance shown that a system of opt-out clauses (in this case granted to the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden) may allow for differentiation even though it requires amendments at the primary law level. 
After the grand adventure of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the resulting constitutional fatigue, 
it might not be a reasonable path in energy. The Amsterdam and the subsequent Lisbon Treaty have 
nevertheless provided for differentiated integration through ‘closer’ and/or ‘enhanced cooperation’ 
which could be triggered by as few as eight and/or nine Member States. However, the complexity of 
this mechanism has so far prevented its use in practice. It therefore is legitimate to wonder whether 
differentiation outside the framework of the Treaties is not the right sort of low key legal framework
5 
in a field like energy. Legal conditions for taking this path indeed appear less onerous than the 
conditions set for intra-EU closer cooperation and, by acting under international law Member States 
preserve complete control over the negotiations process and almost complete control over 
implementation and enforcement of the obligations they accept. 
The objective of this paper is to explore the legal feasibility of establishing a new institutional 
framework a la Schengen allowing some pioneering Member States to commit and promote ad hoc 
common policies in energy escaping the formal and procedural requirements of EU law. We will use 
the term inter se agreement to refer to agreements concluded between two or more Member States of 
the Union following the Schengen model as this is the term traditionally used in international law for 
agreements concluded between some, but not all, parties in an earlier agreement.
6 The paper aims at 
providing the reader with a sense of the key issues and themes that will emerge if EU energy policy 
finds its legal foundation not inside but outside the framework of the Treaties. We will see that the key 
challenge from a legal point of view is to assess the substantive compatibility of such agreements with 
the existing rules of the Union and that short-run differentiation a la Schengen cannot therefore be 
assessed at a high level of generalities. We will thus take two areas where legally-binding cooperation 
at the sub-Union level is often called for: nuclear policy and security of gas supply. The possible 
substantive content of such cooperation will be derived from the economic and political literature 
before the legal feasibility is assessed. 
Section II will explore the different options for short-run differentiation within and outside the 
framework of the Treaties before proposing three criteria against which the legal feasibility of these 
Schengen-like agreements must be assessed. Section III will then apply these criteria to a projected 
inter se agreement on nuclear policy and section IV will proceed similarly for an agreement 
concerning security of gas supply. Concluding remarks will follow.     
                                                      
5  In the words of Shaw, Flexibility in a ‘ Reorganized’ and ‘ Simplified’ Treaty, 40(2) Common Market Law Review 
(2003), 279-311.  
6  See generally B. de Witte, “Old-Fashioned Flexibility: International Agreements between Member States of the European 
Union”, in Burca and Scott, Constitutional Change in the EU from Uniformity to Flexibility? (Oxford, Hart Publishing: 
2000). Legal Feasibility of Schengen-like Agreements in European Energy Policy 
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II. Short Run Differentiation in EU Energy Policy: Options and Legal Criteria  
In energy, a natural tendency towards more or less formal regional cooperation for the regulation of 
cross-border trade has emerged over time. Under the umbrella of the European Regulators' Group for 
Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), certain Member States have signed non-binding Memoranda of 
Understanding outlining the objectives and milestones of regional market integration. In 2004, the 
European Commission acknowledged this voluntary process of micro-harmonisation of the energy 
markets as an important interim step in the constitution of a truly integrated single market. The setting 
up of these so-called Regional Initiatives was primarily intended to facilitate an incremental 
harmonization of information exchanges, capacity calculations and optimisation of allocation.
7 The 
Regional Initiatives are proof that cooperation at the sub-Union level is not only needed, but also 
possible. Their scope is however inherently limited and differentiation on a more ambitious scale will 
require legal frameworks adapt to their obligations as members of the Union.  
We note that differentiation between Member States is not foreign to the EU legal order. 
Flexibility, as a method of policy making, has become a permanent attribute of European integration.
8 
There are plenty of instances where certain Member States found ways to proceed faster on a given 
policy area when others were unwilling or unable to do so. Examples can be drawn from the Social 
Chapter of the TEU,
9 the example of the Schengen Agreement or the introduction of the common 
currency in 1999.
10 These developments led eventually to the constitutionalization of differentiation by 
introducing ‘enhanced cooperation’ as a tool within the Amsterdam Treaty.
11 In fact, the strategic 
objective to avoid cooperation agreements outside the EU framework led some Member States to push 
for a new intra-EU flexibility mechanism during the 1996-97 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC).
12 
Notwithstanding the ‘enhanced cooperation’ mechanism, partial agreements between Member States 
under international law have remained so far the dominant legal tool for differentiated integration.
13 
This section first compares the two options existing to implement short-run differentiation without 
amending primary Union law. It then proposes three criteria to assess the legal feasibility of Schengen-
like agreements.     
1. Enhanced Cooperation (Art 20 TEU) – A Treaty-Based Flexibility Instrument 
At first sight, the most obvious tool for enabling a group of Member States to go ahead in specific 
areas of energy policy might be the establishment of an enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Art 
20 TEU and Art 326 – 334 TFEU. The enhanced cooperation regime is the institutionalized form of 
differentiated integration, accommodating the willingness of certain Member States to pursue 
                                                      
7  For instance, the Regional Initiatives driven by ERGEG have worked on coordinated capacity allocation across borders in 
the North West European gas markets, coordinated demand analysis and investment planning in the Iberian and South 
East European gas markets, regulatory coordination towards harmonized regulatory decision-making across borders and 
improved transparency (second Commission benchmarking report). On the Regional Initiatives, see generally De Jong, 
“The Regional Approach”, in Clingendael International Energy Programme, Establishing the Internal EU Electricity 
Market (2004). 
8  D. Curtin, “The Shaping of a European Constitution and the 1996 IGC: “Flexibility” as a Key Paradigm?”, 50 
Aussenwirtschaft (1995), p. 237; T. Konstadinides, “Division of Powers in European Union Law. The Delimitation of 
Internal Competence between the EU and the Member States” (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2009), at 250. 
9  C. Bernard, EC Employment Law, 3rd Ed (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2006), Ch. 1.  
10  Although the latter represents a substantially different case of flexibility involving amendments at the primary law level. 
11  T. Konstadinides, supra note 7, at 252. 
12  B. de Witte, supra note 6, with reference to the Commissions opinion on the IGC of 2000, Adapting the institutions to 
make success of enlargement, Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 2/2000, at 25.  
13  B. de Witte, ibid. Nicole Ahner, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque 
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integration at a faster pace than others using the common EU institutions.
14 Remarkably, once 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, there has not been a single instance so far where this mechanism 
has been used in practice. This does not imply that it has never been considered, let alone used as a 
threat in negotiations. In fact, it has been reduced rather frequently to a bargaining chip on issues 
where unanimity was required.
15 If applied rigorously and literally, the procedural requirements of the 
Art 20 TFEU procedure appear very restrictive. This is probably why this instrument has never been 
used. Reformed already by the Nice Treaty, the rules governing enhanced cooperation underwent 
some simplifying changes again with the Lisbon Treaty. However, the conditions for triggering 
enhanced cooperation remain arguably very restrictive.  
First of all, the minimum number of Member States required to initiate an enhanced cooperation 
agreement has gone from eight to nine. Second, regarding the authorization process, the initial 
authorizing decision shall be enacted by qualified majority without further qualifications (except in 
CFSP).
16 The final authorisation decision to launch the projected enhanced cooperation shall then be 
adopted only when the ‘Council has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be 
attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole’, a requirement which will not be met 
easily.
17 Thirdly, the initiation is lying mainly in the hands of the Commission: the Member States 
have to submit a request to the Commission, not to the Council, specifying the scope and objectives of 
the projected cooperation. The Commission then submits it to the Council and thus preserves a 
supranational review. The Commission remains the only gateway for launching a concrete legal text.
18 
Regarding the content of possible cooperation agreements, there are two limitations: nothing can be 
done in enhanced cooperation that the Union would not be entitled to do itself, nor can anything be 
done in a different way from that which the Union could itself do. This is due to the fact that enhanced 
cooperation is governed by the same legal bases as those governing the Union, i.e. the same powers, 
the same instruments of action, and the same procedures.
19 Another limitation of this instrument is that 
the cooperation must remain ‘within the framework of the Union's non-exclusive competences’, thus 
enhanced cooperation would for instance not be possible in decisive areas of EU energy policy such as 
such as commercial policy or competition.  
Against this background, it remains to be seen whether and how Member States will be able to 
overcome the procedural constraints of the enhanced cooperation mechanism. Despite the few 
advantages of the Treaty-based mechanism, such as the possibility to use the Union institutions or 
increased democracy and transparency, strong disadvantages continue to exist, particularly the rigidity 
of the procedural requirements even with the reformed Treaty. Other forms of flexibility might 
therefore be more adequate to enhance EU energy policy.  
2. Reinforced Cooperation Outside the Institutional Framework of the EU: The Schengen Model 
An alternative to the intra-Union closer cooperation framework is offered by partial agreements, i.e. 
Treaties prepared and concluded outside the institutional framework of the EU between some Member 
States under international law. This means that Member States decide to leave the narrow framework 
                                                      
14  D. Thym, “The Political Character of Supranational Differentiation”, 31 European Law Review (2006), 781. 
15  One example is the negotiation on the framework decision introducing the European Arrest Warrant. It has been blocked 
for a long-time by Italy. The other Member States used the threat of the introduction of the mechanism of enhanced co-
operation to get Italy to agree to this piece of legislation. 
16  Art. 329 TFEU. 
17  Art. 20 (2) TEU. 
18  F. Tekin, W. Wessels, “Flexibility within the Lisbon Treaty: Trademark or Empty Promise?”, EIPASCOPE 2008, at 1. 
Available at: http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/eipascope/20080509184449_SCOPE2008-1-5_TekinandWessels.pdf  
19  CEPS, Egmont, EPC (2007), The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations, Joint Study, November 
2007, available at: http://www.ceps.eu/node/1385. Legal Feasibility of Schengen-like Agreements in European Energy Policy 
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of EU law and conclude agreements among themselves. Hence, they exercise the Treaty-making 
powers they have preserved not only in relation to third-party countries but also in their mutual 
relationships.
20 When acting under international law the Member States preserve complete control 
over the negotiations process and almost complete control over implementation and enforcement of 
the obligations they accept. 
The archetype of cooperation that started outside the treaty framework is the Schengen Agreement. 
It was established when a consensus on abolishing the passport controls at the intra-Community 
borders could not be reached. It led to the initial decision of Germany, France and the Benelux 
countries to cooperate and create between them a territory without internal border in 1985.
21 The 
Schengen regime is also the first institutionalized example of reinforced cooperation occurring 
between a number of Member States that is operating – after its incorporation into the Union acquis - 
under the legal framework of the EU to attain a treaty objective. The most recent example of 
cooperation through partial agreement is the Treaty of Prüm on extended data exchange and 
intensified cooperation which was signed in May 2005 by only seven Member States.
22 The legal 
conditions for taking the route outside the common institutional framework are less onerous than the 
conditions set for intra-EU closer cooperation. Nevertheless, they are also subject to important legal 
limits which will be examined in the following section. 
3. Legal Criteria for Assessing the Feasibility of Schengen-Like Agreements 
As a general rule, the Member States are free to enter agreements inter se. However, this must be in 
full compliance with Union law. The legal limits to the Member States’ ability to conclude Schengen-
like agreements originate from the principle of supremacy of Union law. This principle is absolute in 
the sense that it encompasses national law as a whole, including constitutional law.
23 Clearly stated for 
the first time in the Costa Enel case it implies that once Union law exists, conflicting national norms 
are inapplicable.
24 For the treaty-making competence of the Member States this means that an inter se 
agreement cannot not be concluded where Union law exists. 
But how much Union law must exist, and is an actual conflict needed between the existing Union 
law and the provisions of the envisaged agreement to render it illegal? This is only one question raised 
by the intricate relationship between the supremacy principle and projected Schengen-like agreements. 
Thus there is a need to operationalize the supremacy principle in order to conduct a feasibility 
assessment. Criteria need to be identified in order to determine whether a conflict between the 
provisions of a projected inter se agreement and Union law would arise in a specific situation.
25 
Following the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and legal doctrine the relevant criteria are 
pre-emption, primacy of Union law and subsidiarity.   
                                                      
20  B. de Witte, supra note 6. 
21  A. Wiener, “Forging Flexibility – The British “No” to Schengen”, (2000) 00/1 Arena Working Paper, Oslo. 
22  G. Amato, J. Ziller, R. Lizasoain, ”The European Constitution” (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2007), at 36. 
23  Kovar, “The Relationship between Community Law and National Law”, in EC Commission (ed.), Thirty Years of 
Community Law (1981), at 112. 
24  Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, [1964] ECR 585 at 593-4: “The integration into the laws of each Member States of provisions 
which derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the treaty, make it impossible for the 
states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them 
on the basis of reciprocity. The executive force of community law cannot vary from one state to another in deference to 
subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.” This has been confirmed 
e.g. in Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 
[1970] ECR 1125. For a general commentary see Kovar, ibid, at 112. 
25  Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A Framework of Analysis”, 29 
Common Market Law Review (1992), 447-472. Nicole Ahner, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque 
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a. The Criterion of Pre-emption  
Pre-emption is the main criterion for assessment in the field of energy policy. It is still a loosely 
defined concept ranging from straightforward contradictions with Union law to subtle and hypothetical 
friction to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
26 However, certain key implementing principles can be 
found in the case law which actually leave substantial space for inter se agreements.   
The doctrine of Union pre-emption has so far yielded only little commentary.
27 The first important 
statement was made in the Simenthal case (1978) where the Court stated that Union law “render[s] 
automatically inapplicable any conflicting provisions of current national law but – in so far as they 
are an integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the territory of each of 
the Member States – also preclude[s] the valid adoption of new national legislative measures to the 
extent to which it would be incompatible with Community provisions”.
28 The objective of the pre-
emption criterion is thus to establish a conflict rule.
29 To define whether a projected inter se agreement 
would conflict with the relevant Treaty articles and secondary legislation, a four-tier analysis is 
suggested. 
1. Does the projected inter se agreement legislate in an area of exclusive Union competence?  
Typical fields of Union exclusive competence are e.g. the common commercial policy or competition 
law. In these areas, inter se agreements are illegal even if Union law has not yet occupied the field.
30 
Inter se agreements are thus only possible in fields of exclusive competence of the Member States or 
in areas of shared competence.
31 Shared powers can be either concurring or parallel competences. 
Parallel competences (the Union and the Member States can take action independently from each 
other) are the exception and are extremely rare. The vast majority of shared powers are concurring 
powers (as in energy), i.e. that Member States theoretically have competences to take measures and 
thus can sign inter se agreements until the Union issues its Directives or Regulations. In other words, 
as soon as the Union exercises its shared competence, Member States are pre-empted from taking 
further legal action (Art 2(2) TFEU).
32 As a first approximation this seems to mean that Member 
States may conclude an inter se agreement only until and insofar as the Union has not exercised its 
competence. In reality however, the exercise of competence by the Union in case of concurring 
competences and the impact it may have on the Member State’s treaty-making powers involves a 
complex assessment of the true extensiveness of what is called ‘occupation of the field’ by Union law, 
and what is the scope of ‘the field’ itself.
33 
                                                      
26  Schuetze, 2006, supra note 4. 
27  From early attempts, e.g. Waelbroeck, “The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption – Consent and Re-
delegation”, in Sandalow and Stein (eds.), Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe, Vol 
2 (1982), 548-580 and Weiler, “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism”, 1981 Yearbook of 
European Law, 267-277, to recently Schuetze, “Supremacy without Pre-emption? The Very Slow Emergent Doctrine of 
Community Preemption”, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006), 1034 - 1048. 
28  Case 106/77, Simenthal, [1978] ECR 629, para 643-44.  
29  Cross, (1992), supra note 3. 
30  Jacobs and Karst, “The ‘Federal’ Legal Order, the USA and Europe Compared: A Juridical Perspective”, Vol 1, book 3 
(1986), at 237 and Weiler (1981), supra note 4. 
31  We note that when the Union fails to act in case of exclusive competence, Member States cannot step in and sign an inter 
se agreement but must bring proceedings before the Court of Justice against the defaulting institution.  
32  Art 2(2) TFEU reads: “When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific 
area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall 
exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again 
exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.” 
33  As pointed out by Waelbroeck (1982), supra note 4: “the essential problem here is to define the scope of the Community 
competence”. Emphasis added.    Legal Feasibility of Schengen-like Agreements in European Energy Policy 
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2. Occupation of the field by Union law - does the projected inter se agreement “affect a matter with 
which [Union law] has dealt extensively”?
34 
For  inter se agreements in areas of shared competence to be illegal, pre-emption requires either 
extensive ‘occupation of the field’ by means of Union legal acts (field pre-emption).
35 Extensive 
occupation of the field can be implied or potential, which means that even though there is no Union 
legislation, the Union may still have a duty to fill this gap. The very existence of this duty prevents 
Member States from acting. This happens for instance when secondary legislation expressly gives a 
duty to the Union to legislate on a specific issue of shared competence, which amounts to a quasi-
exclusive competence (in the sense of Art 3 TFEU). In rare cases, secondary legislation also expressly 
forbids action by Member States.
36 However, pre-emption is most often implied which also precludes 
inter se agreements even when they do not conflict substantively with Union law.
37 Implied pre-
emption arises when the field is covered so “exhaustively”
38 that there is no room for further Member 
States action.
39 This has been stated by the Court in Prantl: “Once rules of the common organization 
of the market may be regarded as forming a complete system, the Member States no longer have 
competence in that field unless Community law expressly provides otherwise”.
40 This reasoning was 
for instance used by the Court in Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti in 1979
41 or in 
Commission v. Germany in 1986.
42 This means that secondary legislation, e.g. a Directive or 
Regulation, pre-empts any agreement falling within its scopes. Member States are precluded from 
concluding agreements containing conditions that are more restrictive, detailed or simply different 
than those laid down in the secondary legislation in question. In this case again, implied pre-emption 
of a specified field has similar effects as an exclusive competence as defined in Art 3 TFEU.
43  
Given the proliferation of secondary Union law in many fields of shared competence (energy 
included), the combination of actual and potential ‘occupation of the field’ very restrictive of Member 
States’ treaty-making powers. In reality, this is a situation which has to be assessed case-by-case and 
“should not be assumed too lightly”.
44 Assessing ‘exhaustion’ indeed requires a thorough 
understanding of a particular market and subtle judgment of the extent of Union legislation coverage. 
We note that the ‘exhaustion’ argument has almost only been raised by the Court in the case of 
                                                      
34  Case 218/85, 3532, supra note 8, para 13. Emphasis added. 
35  Of course Member States may still conclude so-called implementing agreements in the case of the European legislator 
specifically authorises them to do so.  
36  See e.g. in Case 130/85, Groothandel in Im- en Export van Eiern en Eiprodukten Wulro BV against a disciplinary 
decision of the Tuchtgerecht of the Stichting Scharreleiern-Control, [1986] ECR 2035. 
37  See Case 469/98, Commission v. Finland, [2002] ECR I – 9627, para 102. 
38  Case 255/86, Commission v. Belgium, [1988] ECR 693. 
39  Case 148/78, Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629. See also Schuetze (2006), supra note 4, at 
1034 and Cross (1992), supra note 3, at 459.  
40  Case 16/83, Prantl, [1984] ECR 1299, para 6.  
41  Case 148/78, Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629, para 26-27: “a Member State may not 
introduce into its national legislation conditions which are more restrictive than those laid down in the directive in 
question, or which are even more detailed or in any event different”. 
42  Case 48/85, Commission v. Germany, [1986] ECR 2549, at 12-13: “it is one of the fundamental characteristics of a 
common organization of the market that in the sectors concerned the Member States can no longer take action through 
national provisions adopted unilaterally”.  
43  For R. Schutze (2006), supra note 4, “the reason for total exclusion lies in the perceived fear that any supplementary 
national action may endanger or interfere with the strict uniformity of the Community regime”.  
44  See B. De Witte, supra note 6. See also Case 218/85 CERAFEL v. Le Campion, supra note 8 and Case 255/86, 
Commission v. Belgium (Bulk Fruit), [1988] ECR 693.  Nicole Ahner, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque 
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agricultural markets and that most markets in Europe are not covered as extensively.
45 The ‘field’ 
itself is not a clearly defined concept as the Court has sometimes used the argument of field pre-
emption to assess the allocation of competence on an area covered by only one article of a Directive.
46    
3. Does the projected inter se agreement conflict substantively with the rules or the objectives of 
Union law in the relevant field?  
In case of shared competences and non-exhaustive occupation of the field the area covered by the 
projected inter se agreement as compared to the existing rules of Union law needs to be defined. This 
is why the legal feasibility of Schengen-like agreements cannot be assessed at a high level of 
generalities. The problem then becomes to assess the substantive compatibility of the projected inter 
se agreement with the existing rules and objectives in this precise area of Union law. In the case of 
direct conflict, the inter se agreement would be illegal, which is the essence of the supremacy 
principle.
47 This could happen for instance when certain provisions of the inter se agreement are 
intended to limit the impact of existing secondary law.
48 Once a conflict is found to exist, there is a 
qualitative assessment to be done on the intensity of this conflict vis a vis the rules or the objectives of 
secondary Union law.
49 In the case of an absence of relevant rules, compliance of the inter se 
agreement with the stated objectives of Union law is critical.
50 Here the Gallaher case is very 
illustrative. The case was about possible stricter regulations adopted at national level, which were 
contested. As Article 3 (3) of the Directive 89/622 concerning the labelling of tobacco products 
required that health warnings should cover “at least 4 % of the corresponding surface”, the British 
government tightened the obligations of manufacturers by stipulating that the specific warning ought 
to cover 6% of the surfaces on which they were printed. The Court allowed the stricter measure based 
on a broad interpretation of the wording of Art 3. 
In practice, a sliding scale must be used as some minor, hypothetical or temporary conflict could 
for instance be accepted. Such an approach is indeed necessary as there are grey areas in practice 
between the extreme case where Member States can legislate freely as long as there is no direct 
conflict with existing Union law and when they are fully pre-empted due to exhaustive occupation of 
the field.
51 
4. Obstacle pre-emption - does the projected inter se agreement “interfere with the proper 
functioning” of the Union system?  
In the case of absence of conflict, the last step of the pre-emption analysis requires assessing the 
impact of the projected inter se agreement on the proper functioning of the Union system and the 
                                                      
45  See De Witte, ibid, p. 31, who actually agrees with Bernard (1996) who writes: “one has to conclude that pre-emption has 
a fairly narrow field of application and concerns primarily the common organizations of agricultural markets. Even there, 
pre-emption analysis must be handled with caution and the limits of the field being occupied must be defined with care” 
in Bernard, “The future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity”, Common Market Law 
Review (1996), at 663.  
46  Case 52/92, Commission v. Portuguese Republic, [1993] ECR 2961, para 19. 
47  Tample Lang, “The ERTA Judgment and the Court’s Case Law on Competence and Conflict”, 1986 Yearbook of 
European Law, 183.  
48  See e.g. Case 158/88, Commission v. Ireland, [1990] ECR I-2367 and Case 60/86, Commission v. United Kingdom 
(Dim-Dip Car Lights), [1988] ECR 3921. 
49  See e.g. Case 223/78, Grosoli, [1979] ECR 2621, at 2631-2. 
50  See Waelbroeck (1982), supra note 4 and Case 50-76, Amsterdam Bulb BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, [1977] 
ECR, para 9: “The compatibility with the community regulations of the provisions referred to by national court must be 
considered in the light not only of the express provisions of the Regulation but also of their aims and objectives.”  
51  On this line see e.g. Weiler “the External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle” in 
Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (CUP, 1999), 130-187, at 173, in his commentary of the ERTA judgment.  Legal Feasibility of Schengen-like Agreements in European Energy Policy 
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current dynamics of integration. The question to be solved here was best expressed by the Court in 
Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association v. Ireland and could be phrased as follows: does the 
Member States’ law have effects “which obstructs the working of the machinery established by the 
common organization of the market”?
52 This is particularly important in sectors where the EU builds 
both competitive markets and the institutions to support it.
53 One illustrative example was the Bussone 
case where the Court held that the adoption of a national rule was precluded as it might hinder directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially the effectiveness of the Union system.
54 The inter se agreement 
should not endanger the integrity of the Union legal order.
55  
b. Primacy of Union Law 
The second criterion to be assessed is the substantive compatibility between the future inter se 
agreement and general rules of Union law. Even if the inter se agreement does not affect the legal 
rights of other Member States, it cannot conflict in substance with Union law. This safeguard is 
intended to guarantee stability and uniform application of Union law. It directly derives from the 
Member States’ duty of sincere cooperation (former Art 10 EC, now Art 4(3) TEU).
56 As a result, 
inter-governmental cooperation established by a Treaty cannot be used as an argument to impede the 
development of policy at the Union level.
57 
In practice, a typical incompatibility which may arise with general principles of Union law is 
related to discrimination on grounds of nationality. Such discrimination seems almost inherent to the 
existence of inter se agreements to which only some Member States participate. It does not mean that 
benefits cannot be enjoyed exclusively by the Member States signing the agreement but that 
undertakings of other Member States should not arbitrarily be excluded. In our case, state aid and 
competition rules will also have to be taken into account in addition to non-discrimination as an inter 
se agreement should not distort competition in the internal energy market.  
Where possible conflicts are foreseen, it is suggested to insert a conflict rule in the projected inter 
se agreements, such as it has been done e.g. in Art 134 of the Schengen Convention (1990): “the 
provisions of this Convention shall apply only in so far as they are compatible with Community law”. 
Such a clause would contribute to show good faith on the part of Member States vis-à-vis their duty of 
sincere cooperation. We note that the inter se agreement would have more chance to be seen as lawful 
if it is expressly presented as an interim agreement, preparing the field for further integration at the 
Union level, thus not a separate and rival cooperation regime, which would run counter to the Member 
States duty of sincere cooperation.
58  
                                                      
52  Case 36/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association v. Ireland, [1981] ECR 735 at 751, para 19. 
53  Schuetze, supra note 4. 
54  Case 31/78, Francesco Bussone v. Italian Ministry of Agriculture, [1978] ECR 2429. 
55  Case 2/88, Imm. Zwartveld, [1990] ECR I-3365, para 17; Case 275/02, First & Franex, [2002] ECR I-10943, para 49; 
Case 339/00, Ireland v. Commission, [2003] ECR I-1175, para 71; Case 344/01, Germany v. Commission, [2004] ECR I-
2081, para 79; Case 459/03, Commission v. Ireland, [2006] ECR, I-4635, para 174 and Delvaux and Guimaraes-
Purokoski, “Vertical Division of Competence between the European Community and its Member States in the Energy 
Field – Some Remarks on the Evolution of Community Energy Law and Policy”, in Delvaux, Hunt and Talus (eds.), EU 
Energy Law and Policy Issues (Euroconfidential, 2008). 
56  Art 4(3) TEU reads: “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.” 
57  Art 4(3) TEU also reads: “The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union's objectives.”  
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c. Principle of Subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity applies in fields of shared competence. Legal doctrine on the principle of 
subsidiarity is nearly exclusively focused on the question of whether the Union or the Member States 
should act.
59  
Given the special qualities of Union law (e.g. higher transparency in decision-making
60 or a more 
effective compliance system), inter se agreements should generally be considered less effective and 
therefore Union law should be preferred “in the name of subsidiarity.”
61 This means in practice that, 
where action at Union level is in view of the scale of the problem marginally less appropriate than an 
inter se agreement between Member States, Union action should be preferred to the conclusion of an 
inter se agreement. This is in a way mirroring the former Amsterdam Protocol on subsidiarity which 
stated that “action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects 
compared with action at the level of the Member States.” Indeed, the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity to inter se agreements means that Member States’ actions through inter se agreements 
should produce clear benefits compared with action at the level of the Union to be legal.  
The ‘value-added’ test of inter se agreement compared to Union action is inextricably linked to the 
political feasibility of action at Union level. Thus, the determination of the ability of the Union to act 
relies on the ex ante ability to reach unanimity or success through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). 
Inter se agreements should thus be particularly suitable in the case where e.g. an agreement involving 
a few neighbouring Member States on a highly localized issue and a contrario is not be suitable when 
strong externalities on other (non-contracting) Member States exist.
62  
III. Towards Short-Run Differentiation Outside the Framework of the Treaties in 
Nuclear: An Early Assessment 
There are two main drivers for renewed support for nuclear power in several Member States: the need 
for secure electricity supply and the need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG thereafter) emissions.
63 The 
potential impact of nuclear on security of supply and GHG emissions has been quoted on several 
instances by the Commission, for instance in its Second Strategic Energy Review (2008).
64 Today 
several countries (such as the UK, Italy and Romania) are thus implementing or considering a long-
term net growth in nuclear capacity but several others (including i.e. Ireland and Austria) remain 
resolutely opposed. It is then unlikely that Europe will be able to “speak with one voice” on matters of 
electricity generation mix and nuclear power, an exclusive competence of the Member States (Art 
194(2) TFEU). While there is a widespread sense that handling key aspects of nuclear policy at the 
European level could have real merit, the political realities strongly militate against such an approach. 
The very slow process towards the enactment of the Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM 
                                                      
59  See generally on the principle of subsidiarity Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (oxford University 
Press, 1982); Toth, “The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty”, 29 Common Market Law Review (1992), 
1079-1105; Davies, “Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time”, 43 Common Market Law 
Review (2006), 63-84.  
60  See e.g. Art 5 to 7 of the Protocol No 2 on the application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality in the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
61  De Witte, 2000, supra note 24, at 54. 
62  This was in a way recognized in the Amsterdam protocol on subsidiarity: “the issue under consideration has transnational 
aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States”. 
63  ENEF, (European Nuclear Energy Forum, Subgroup “Nuclear Legal Road Map of WG “Opportunities”) The Importance 
of New Approaches in Licensing (2008); Nuttal and Newbery, “Prospects for a European Supply of Security and Nuclear 
Power”, CESSA Policy Briefs (2008).  
64  DG TREN, Second Strategic Energy Review, An EU Security and Solidarity Action Plan, COM(2008) 781 final of 
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establishing a Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations showed again how 
reluctant many Member States are to pool any national control over the opening and operation of their 
nuclear industries in the interests of a Europe-wide regulation. This is why the possibilities for legally-
binding agreements at the sub-Union level and outside the framework of the Treaties need to be 
investigated for nuclear energy.  
Stronger cooperation among pro-nuclear countries would aim at ensuring increased cooperation in 
the fuel cycle, including progress towards implementation of disposal of high-level radioactive waste 
and spent nuclear fuel. Increased cooperation between national regulators is also needed so that the 
new designs of reactors are available for construction under an effective and efficient regulatory 
system.
65 Some areas for cooperation have for instance been defined in the Conclusions of the 4th 
plenary meeting of the European Nuclear Energy Forum (Prague, 28-29 May 2009).
66  
Member States’ capability to further such collaboration remains however bound by a number of 
specific obligations on how they act with respect to there nuclear industry. Most importantly, as 
members of the EU, these Member States are subject to EU law and must comply with the Directives 
and Regulations made under the EURATOM Treaty.
67 The Treaty has survived recent attempts to 
have it incorporated into the main treaty during the debate on a new constitution for the EU, and 
remains an important source of rule-making for all Member States on this issue.
68  
This section explores whether a legally-binding international law agreement a la Schengen among 
a few Member States would be a plus and indeed feasible from a legal point of view, as a preparatory 
step for improvement at the Union level. It will for this purpose study the legal feasibility (against the 
criteria defined in Part II, namely the pre-emption of Treaty competence, the primacy of EU law and 
the principle of subsidiarity) of three possible areas of cooperation at the sub-Union level: 
•  Clarifying Market Rules for Nuclear Investors and Operators 
•  Disposal of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel 
•  Common Framework for Reactor Design Assessment 
                                                      
65  International Energy Agency, “The European Union”, IEA Energy Policies Review (2008) 
66  In the spirit of the Florence and Madrid Forums, the Commission proposed in 2007 to organise a broad discussion among 
all relevant stakeholders on the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy. This was endorsed by the leaders of the 27 EU 
Member States in March 2007. Since then, the European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) gathers all relevant stakeholders 
in the nuclear field: governments of the 27 EU Member States, European Institutions including the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee, nuclear industry, electricity consumers and the civil society. 
67 Even though not extensively addressed in this section, they are also constrained by the various international 
environmental treaties to which they are a party even if they do not directly impact upon the nuclear industry, but do so or 
may do so indirectly. An example of this is the Aarhus Convention, which promotes public participation in decision-
making. This Convention gives further rights to the citizens in environmental matters. The Aarhus Convention was 
transposed into Community law through the Directives 2003/4/EC (information) and 2003/35/EC (participation). 
Directive 2003/624/EC (access to justice) is still under discussion. Both adopted Directives already contain some 
provisions on access to justice. The accession to the Aarhus Convention led to the revision of the environmental 
legislation of the EU, as appropriate, part of which covers nuclear issues (e.g. the 85/337/EEC Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive has been amended by the 2003/35/EC Directive). In the specific field of nuclear energy, some legal 
uncertainties appear due to the fact that the Aarhus Convention was signed under the EC Treaty and not under the 
EURATOM Treaty (DG TREN website). We note however that fields covered by the Aarhus convention do not a priori 
require more cooperation among Member States (except maybe on sharing of best practices) but better cooperation at the 
local level.   
68  The Lisbon Treaty does however bring some substantial changes to the functioning of the EURATOM Treaty but 
concern mainly procedural and institutional provisions which do not concern us here.   Nicole Ahner, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque 
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1. Clarifying Market Rules for Nuclear Investors and Operators: Rationale and Legal Feasibility 
a. Content of the Proposition 
An inter se agreement could clarify market rules for nuclear investors and operators on two core 
pieces.  
First, a transparent and user friendly ‘non-binding competition policy handbook’ on the design and 
use of long-term electricity contracts could be agreed on. In the new European competitive energy 
paradigm, large and stable spot markets should be liquid enough to enable firms to sink high fixed-
cost investments based on reliable investment signals. Yet, European spot markets remain under-
developed.
69 In the present situation, long-term contracts help mitigate some market risks by providing 
an insurance device which will also helps secure funds with investment banks under project financing 
structures.
70 This is particularly consequential for high fixed-cost technology such as nuclear because 
the greater the fixed costs are, the greater price and quantity risks are in volatile energy markets.
71 
However, long-term electricity contracts create severe risks of anti-competitive effects (e.g. 
foreclosure) and have become a focus of scrutiny for European and competition authorities.
72 As a 
result, market operators are left uncertain on how they can structure (e.g. on duration, exclusivity or 
use restrictions) long-term contracts, which increases market risk and creates a severe impediment to 
the nuclear renaissance.   
Second, an inter se agreement could define robust legal and regulatory regime guiding nuclear 
investors on: 
•  the creation of joint ventures with other suppliers; 
•  the use of “open season” mechanisms to booking their generating capacity to suppliers or to 
selling long-term energy contracts to industrial consumers; 
•  investment in merchant lines. 
In the face of the different market risks investors face (e.g. volume and price risks, misalignment of 
contract incentives with potential buyers, under-development of European spot and forward markets)
73 
some innovative contract structures such as consortium, joint ventures and collective buying schemes 
are increasingly considered and implemented (e.g. in Finland and France).
74 What is acceptable from a 
competition point of view remains much of a black hole which is detrimental for legal certainty.
75 The 
use of “open season” faces the same problem whereas it is a way to mitigate competition problems and 
                                                      
69  DG COMP, 2007. Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC(2006) 1724, 232-244 and 283-294. 
70  Finon, D., Roques, F., 2008. Financing Arrangements and Industrial Organization for New Nuclear Build in Electricity 
Markets. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 9(3), 247-281; Lacy, B., 2006. Nuclear Investment: 
Performance and Opportunity. Communication to the World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium 2006. 
71  Finon and Roques, 2008, ibid; Roques, F., Newbery, D., Nuttal, W., 2005. Investment Incentives and Electricity Market 
Design: the British Experience. Review of Network Economics 4(2), 93-128. 
72  Hauteclocque and Glachant, “Long-term Energy Supply Contracts in European Competition Policy: Fuzzy not Crazy”, 
37(12) Energy Policy (2009), 5399-5407. 
73  For a full overview see Hauteclocque and Glachant, “Long-term Energy Supply Contracts in European Competition 
Policy: Fuzzy not Crazy”, 37(12) Energy Policy (2009), 5399-5407. 
74  These contracting schemes for instance include risk-sharing generated between industrial consumers and electricity 
operators (EPR, Zandvliet, Roselectra, TVO), partnership between consumers and generators valuing a secondary fuel 
(DK6) or consumers cooperative purchasing electricity (Exeltium). 
75  Hauteclocque, “Legal Uncertainty and Competition Policy in European Deregulated Electricity Markets: the Case of 
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market test demand.
76 Merchant lines are investments in interconnection undertaken by private parties 
fully or partially exempted from the rules on Third Party Access (thereafter TPA) and/or the rules on 
the use of the congestion rent. From the point of view of nuclear investors (and buyers involved in 
some of the hybrid contractual structures described above), investing in merchant lines in parallel to 
investing in nuclear capacities can have the advantage to secure sales abroad when regulated 
interconnectors are highly congested.
77  
Overall, a robust market frame could provide a clearer view on what is presumably pro- and anti-
competitive with long-term contracting, joint venture and possible exemptions of TPA in this area and 
therefore reduce the uncertainty surrounding investors, operators and business consumers interested in 
nuclear energy. 
b. Legal Assessment  
Competition policy (Art 101 - 102 TFEU) is an exclusive competence of the Union (Art 3(1) TFEU) 
and EU competition rules do not exclude or exempt nuclear energy.
78 Therefore, EU competition rules 
apply to activities in the field of nuclear energy to the extent that they do not derogate from the 
provisions of the EURATOM Treaty.
79 The provisions of the EURATOM Treaty more closely linked 
to ‘market frame’ issues are Art 92 – 100 EURATOM (Chapter 9 on “The Nuclear Common 
Market”). In Case 1/78 of the ECJ Draft IAEA Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials, Facilities and Transports, the Court expressly clarified that the Commission has powers 
(shared competence) for the creation of a nuclear common market and stated that Chapter 9 of the 
EURATOM Treaty needs to be interpreted as an application of the general common market in the 
specialized field of nuclear energy: “In the field of supply and movement of nuclear materials the 
Commission is endowed with a number of prerogatives which are defined in detail by Articles 52 to 
76
80 on the one hand and articles 92 to 100 on the other (..)” (para. 12). However, these provisions 
concern only “the goods and products specified in the lists forming Annex IV to this Treaty” (Art 92 
EURATOM), i.e. primary fuel (uranium and its derivatives), whereas we need a more robust market 
frame regarding sales and transport of the energy produced from primary fuels (i.e. electricity).  
As a result, most market frame issues (long-term energy contracts and joint venture) are under the 
jurisdiction of competition rules where the Commission enjoys exclusive competence. Several major 







86 On the 
                                                      
76  DG TREN, 2004. Note of interpretation on Directives 2003/54-55 and Regulation 1228/03 in the electricity and gas 
internal market: Exemptions from certain provisions of the third party access regime; DG TREN, 2009. Commission 
Staff Working Document on Article 22 of directive 2003/55/EC concerning common rules for the internal energy market 
in natural gas and Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity – New infrastructure exemptions. SEC(2009) 642 final; ERGEG, 2007. Treatment of new 
infrastructure: European regulators’ experience with Art. 22 exemptions of Directive 2003/55/EC. Ref: E07-TNI-01-04; 
ERGEG, 2007. Guidelines for good practices on open season procedures. Ref: C06-GWG-29-05c. 
77  Also, their capacities are allocated with a maximum duration of one year in the best case, see ETSO, 2006. An overview 
of current cross-border congestion management methods in Europe. 
78  See e.g. in antitrust cases COMP/37.363 Svenska Atomförsäkringspoolen, COMP/34.985 Pool Italiano Rischi Atomici 
and COMP/34.558 Aseguradores Riesgos Nucleares; in merger control: Case IV/M.773 Westinghouse/Equipos 
Nucleares of 18.12.1996 or Case COMP/M.4153 Toshiba/Westinghouse (19.9.2006). 
79  Cases 188/80 France, Italy and United Kingdom v. Commission (1982) ECR 2545 [1982] 3 CMLR 144, p. 32 
80  Art 52 to 76 EURATOM covers the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials through the European 
Supply Agency. 
81  Synergen: Report on Competition Policy 2002; IP/02/792 of 31.5.2002. 
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problem of long-term contracts across Member States and long term priority access rights to the 
network, the court came close to a ban in VEMW (2005).
87 The treatment of nuclear joint venture is 
also covered by competition rules (and EURATOM in specific cases such as ITER) and the test for 
merchant lines by the Regulation 714/2009 in three decisions recently (BritNed, Estlink and East West 
Cable).   
The Commission has made clear that its single energy market initiative will apply to nuclear energy 
in the same way as to any other and that a rigorous application of the relevant state aid
88 and 
competition rules implies a level playing field for all energy sources. To the extent that nuclear energy 
competes on an equal footing with other energy sources, free competition should not only be the rule 
between nuclear operators throughout the EU, but also between nuclear operators and other energy 
providers. Only the case of merchant lines deserves further legal analysis as it belongs to internal 
market rules (Art 26 and 114 TFEU), an area of shared competence (Art 4 TFEU).
89  
The regulation of merchant lines is closely regulated by the Regulation 714/2009 which specifies 6 
criteria for the granting of exemptions on TPA and the use of the congestion rent (Art 7(1))
90 by 
national regulators and the new Association for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). In 
essence, this test is the effects test of EU competition law (Art 101(3) TFEU) carried out ex ante to 
provide more legal certainty for investors.
91 Further clarifying rules for nuclear investors would indeed 
not conflict with this objective. However, Art 7(1) is meant to be an ‘exception test’, namely that “the 
level of the risk is such that the investment would not take place unless the exemption is granted” and 
(Contd.)                                                                   
83  Repsol: COMP/B-1/38.348, O.J. 20.10.2004, C 258/7 and summary of commitments decision in the same case, O.J. 
30.06.2006, L 176/104. 
84  Distrigaz: COMP/37.966, O.J. 5.4.2007, C 77/48; IP/07/1487 and MEMO/07/407 of 11.10.2007. 
85  EDF: COMP/37.386, MEMO/07/313 of 26.7.2007.  
86  Electrabel: COMP/37.387, MEMO/07/313 of 26.7.2007.  
87  VEMW: C-17/03, [2005] ECR I-4983, ECJ. See on VEMW: DG Comp, 2006. Commission staff working paper on 
decision C-17/03 of June 7, 2005 of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, SEC (2006) 547; Talus, “First 
Experience under the Exemption Regime of EC Regulation 1228/2003 on Conditions for Access to the Network on 
Cross-border Exchanges in Electricity”, 25(3) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2005), 266-281 and Talus, 
“First Interpretation of Energy Market Directives by European Court of Justice – Case C-17/03, Vereniging vooe 
Energie”, 24(39), Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2006), 39-52. We note that these contracts are not 
clearly addressed in the Regulation 714/2009 on cross-border exchanges in electricity (Regulation 714/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation 1228/2003, O.J. 14.8.2009, L. 211/15). 
88  See e.g. Approval by the Commission of a package of aid granted to the Scottish nuclear industry, XXth Report on 
Competition Policy (1990). 
89  Even though EU competition rules still apply after the investment is sunk in the case of abuse of a dominant position or 
unlawful concerted practices between the joint owners. We note that competition rules have so far never been used on a 
merchant line exempted under the Art 7 procedure of Regulation 714/2009. We also note that when the national 
regulators or ACER reach a positive decision, the Commission may still request them to amend or withdraw it and the 
notifying entities are required to comply. The Commission is however still not granted the power to overrule Member 
States and NRAs in case they cannot agree, even after ACER mediation. For a precise analysis of the allocation of 
regulatory powers on merchant lines, see Hancher and Hauteclocque, “Manufacturing the EU Energy Markets: The 
Current Dynamics of Regulatory Practice”, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2010/01.   
90  Art 7(1) reads: “(a) the merchant inter-connector should enhance competition in electricity supply; (b) the level of the 
risk is such that the investment would not take place unless the exemption is granted; (c) the inter-connector must be 
owned by a person legally separate from the TSOs; (d) charges must be levied on users of the inter-connector; (e) since 
the start of the European electricity liberalization, no part of the capital or operating costs of the inter-connector has been 
recovered from any component of the network tariffs; (f) the exemption is not to the detriment of competition or the 
effective functioning of the internal electricity market or the efficient functioning of the regulated systems to which the 
inter-connector is linked.” 
91  T. Van der Vijver, “Exemptions to Third Party Access for New Infrastructures in the European Community Gas Sector - 
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this is clearly something that has to be assessed case-by-case. In addition, Art 7(1) is a competition test 
and nuclear investors should not take advantage of clarified guidelines over other competitors. Last, 
without presuming on the extent of the ‘occupation of the field’ by means of Union law for the whole 
internal energy market, it seems clear that field pre-emption would exist at least on the precise scope 
covered the Art 7 of Regulation 714/2009. 
Overall, we believe that the possible improvements of the market frame we proposed could not be 
included in an inter se agreement. 
2. Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste & Spent Nuclear Fuel: Rationale and Legal Feasibility 
a. Content of the Proposition 
The Commission stressed in its Communication on An Energy Policy for Europe of 10 January 2007
92 
that nuclear power raises important issues regarding waste. In its conclusions of 8 May 2007, the 
Council set out that each EU Member State should be urged “to establish and keep updated a national 
programme for the safe management of radioactive waste and spent fuel that includes all radioactive 
waste under its jurisdiction and covers all stages of management”. European countries indeed 
currently adopt different approaches to the fuel cycle.
93  
High level waste and spent fuel subject to direct disposal, which are the most hazardous radioactive 
waste, require long-term isolation and containment. It is internationally accepted that geological 
disposal represents the safest and most sustainable option for long-term management.
94 Progress on 
the implementation of such disposal projects is noted only in a few Member States, namely Finland, 
Sweden and France, and it is likely that these countries will have operational disposal facilities by 
2025.
95 The remaining countries are less advanced. Many of them have not made such progress 
because of the political sensitivity of the issue or insufficient scientific, technical and financial 
resources.
96 Finland demonstrates that even small nuclear programs can afford their own national 
repository but in this case, the cooperation with the Swedish nuclear program has helped to reduce 
costs.  
In order to reach economies of scale on the cost side, there are more and more multi-national 
initiatives in support of national solutions through joint work, programs and knowledge transfer, as 
well as reflections on regional solutions. An inter se agreement could include provisions on disposal of 
high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel as well as the setting-up of regional centres for 
disposal.   
b. Legal Assessment 
Contrary to general safety standards, the specific legal basis on disposal of high-level radio-active 
waste and spent nuclear fuel is currently very thin. General safety standards apply nevertheless. The 
existing safety standards have first been defined in the Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM which 
lays down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public 
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against the dangers arising from ionising radiation. The Council Directive 2006/117/EURATOM
97 on 
the supervision and control of shipments of waste and spent fuel later complemented it. It provides for 
a compulsory and common system of notification and a standard control document for shipments of 
radioactive waste or spent fuel which have a point of departure, transit or destination in an EU 
Member State if the quantities or concentration are over certain limits fixed by Article 3(2)(a) and (b) 
of Directive 96/29/EURATOM. These Directives have recently been complemented by a more general 
Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework to  define basic 
obligations on the safety of nuclear installations whilst strengthening the role of national regulatory 
bodies. 
The management of spent fuel and radioactive waste has thus been addressed at the Union level 
through a variety of legislative instruments, but only for general radiation protection and 
environmental matters. The Court of Justice in its case law had indeed recognized that the Union 
shares competence with the Member States in matter of nuclear safety.
98 At present, waste 
management remains however a national responsibility with Community legislation only covering a 
small range of the issues involved, such as supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste 
and spent fuel. ‘Occupation of the field’ can thus be considered almost non-existent. As stated in 
Recital 7 of the Directive 2006/117: “Each Member State should remain fully responsible for the 
choice of its own policy on the management of the nuclear waste and spent fuel within its jurisdiction, 
some choosing reprocessing of spent fuel, others aiming at final disposal of spent fuel with no other 
use foreseen.” Cooperation on the disposal of high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel as 
well as the setting-up of regional centres for disposal can thus be considered close to being exclusive 
competence of Member States. There is thus no problem of pre-emption of Treaty-making 
competence.
99 We also note that such cooperation would also concur to the realization of EURATOM 
objectives, especially the “establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of 
nuclear energy in the Community” (Art 2(c) EURATOM). However, the safety standards set in Union 
law should be complied with in all cases to avoid conflict pre-emption. We note here that were the 
Commission to table effectively new legislative proposals on the treatment of nuclear waste by the end 
of 2010, as announced by president José Manuel Barroso in March 2010 at the OECD-hosted 
conference on civil nuclear power in Paris, an inter se agreement signed in between could be 
interpreted as creating obstacle pre-emption. The full legality test would then have to be run once the 
new (final) text is known.  
In terms of discrimination on grounds of nationality, as long as foreign undertakings operating in 
one of the contracting Member States would not be precluded to use the new regional centre for 
disposal, primacy of Union law would be respected. In terms of distortion of competition within the 
internal market, the use of such regional repository can hardly be considered as ‘hidden subsidy’ to the 
nuclear industry, especially since the cost efficiencies would a priori be enjoyed by the Member States 
themselves and not by the undertakings. Lastly, the principle of subsidiarity does not appear to be a 
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major problem, especially with regard to the fact that the Commission itself believes that regional 
cooperation could accelerate decision-making on definitive disposal solutions and that regional 
solutions are appealing in terms of economies of scale. Recital 15 of the Directive 2006/117 also 
recalls that “Member States should promote agreements between themselves in order to facilitate the 
safe and efficient management of radioactive waste or spent fuel from Member States that produced it 
in small quantities and where the establishment of appropriate facilities would not be justified from a 
radiological point of view.” For the moment, these issues are addressed only by means of extensive 
consultations at the EU level, and especially in the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and 
Waste Management (ENSREG) and at the European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF). An inter se 
agreement involving waste disposal could thus be presented as an interim step to a Union-wide 
legislation. The Commission’s Report on Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management in the 
European Union even argued that increased cooperation could “facilitate a restart of the discussion in 
the Council and in the European Parliament on a European Union legislation”, thereby showing the 
level of maturity of the subject at European level. 
A regional agreement on the management of high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel, 
including regional centres for disposal, appears as particularly suited for the approach we propose. The 
different directives on nuclear safety should of course be complied with, in particular the Member 
States’ requirements to report periodically to the Commission.  
3. A Common Framework for Reactor Design Assessment: Rationale and Legal Feasibility 
a. Content of the Proposition 
In the framework of reactor design assessment, cooperation among the regulators of the Member 
States could be promoted in an inter se agreement. Although there is movement in Europe towards 
harmonised requirements for licensing, reactor design certification is done nationally.
100 If a design 
has been assessed and certified by one national regulatory authority, replication of efforts does not 
optimise the licensing process.
101 As the national safety requirements tend to converge, it is natural for 
the different authorities to mutually converge in their assessment as well. The resulting standardization 
of reactor designs would greatly contribute to reinforcing the licensing process and making it more 
effective.     
Harmonizing licensing issues is a good way of ensuring that industry can evolve in a stable legal 
and regulatory framework. Fleets of standardized nuclear power plants offer, in general, the potential 
for increased safety trough operational excellence, higher availability and capacity factors and 
improved maintenance efficiency.
102 A greater convergence and harmonization of national standards 
on reactor design assessment would also allow for increased international cooperation among 
regulators, for example by sharing methods and data arising from safety evaluation. As to reactor 
design and technology, utilities are already choosing among fairly standardized designs offered by a 
small number of vendors. These vendors operate worldwide and, in line with the concept of 
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standardization and its obvious advantages, should prefer to get design changes shared by a larger set 
of users.
103 Overall, common reactor design assessment for new builds (and mutual recognition) could 
be promoted through inter se agreement. 
b. Legal Feasibility 
As for the management of nuclear waste and spent fuel, the assessment of reactor designs is only 
subject to the common safety requirements of the Directive 2009/71/EURATOM (on the basis of Art 
2(b) and 30 EURATOM). Union legislation does not go further with harmonization and does not 
include any reciprocity mechanism for design approval. The problem of pre-emption is also largely the 
same as in the previous section. Competences are shared on safety requirements but Member States 
retain exclusive competence (and responsibility) over reactor design assessment, in line with 
established principles of international law. However, to be legal a common licensing scheme with a 
mutual recognition mechanism should not conflict with the safety objectives of the EURATOM 
Treaty. We note also that a predictable and harmonized licensing framework overseen by an 
independent regulatory authority is the keystone for the achievement of nuclear safety. An inter se 
agreement would therefore not raise a problem of pre-emption. 
The problem of primacy of Union law might at first appear more complicated to solve. However, 
giving different answers in different countries does not only lead to a lack of predictability but also to 
a distortion of competition. Free competition in this part of the supply chain is a stated objective of the 
EURATOM Treaty as Art 2(g) states that the Union should “ensure wide commercial outlets and 
access to the best technical facilities by the creation of a common market in specialized materials and 
equipment”. To achieve the necessary confidence and a level-playing field, the licensing framework 
must ensure that regulatory decisions are aligned across Europe. As a result, harmonization among a 
few Member States on the licensing processes, it is submitted, is a natural obstacle to discrimination 
on ground of nationality. However, it could be considered that undertakings already operating in 
Member States parties to the inter se agreement would benefit from an undue advantage compared to 
‘outsiders’, even though it would still be an improvement compared to the current situation. As it is 
purely a problem of harmonization and that discrimination might occur, it might be argued that Union 
law should be favoured in the name of subsidiarity. However, in view of the very long and contentious 
process leading to the Nuclear Safety Directive, it is submitted that Union law could better be used to 
consolidate the future acquis of an inter se agreement and not initiate harmonization of reactor design 
assessment itself.    
4. Conclusion 
The nuclear industry currently has a general need for planning stability and reduction of investment 
risks coming from regulatory and market uncertainty. As for the latter, it appears that an inter se 
agreement would not be legal as market issues in the new competitive paradigm are already heavily 
regulated, not the least by EU competition law. However, this section has shown that common 
approaches at the sub-Union level are possible concerning in particular the licensing process. 
Harmonization and simplification of licensing procedures are critical in order to provide legal 
robustness and certainty. In particular, we have shown that common approaches would be possible on 
the management of radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel, the setting-up of regional repositories 
and common design certification. We have seen that despite the many areas of exclusive competence 
of Member States, there is a strong rationale for continuous action at the Union level, in particular on 
safety under EURATOM and on competition and state aid under the Lisbon Treaty. There is also a 
natural role for the Commission to enhance public awareness on e.g. factual accounts of the operating 
history of nuclear facilities, enact a roadmap for European nuclear energy and spread good practices. 
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European solidarity for the fulfilment of closure commitment in Central and Eastern European 
countries will also continue. The Commission holds a limited power of regulatory oversight but it 
exists nevertheless. Any international law agreement between Member States should thus recognize 
the continuous rights of the Commission. However, in view of the tensions raised by the debate on the 
future of EURATOM in the context of the discussions on the Lisbon Treaty, it seems that an inter se 
agreement on nuclear cooperation could be a way to go forward in the targeted areas described above.   
IV. Towards Short-Run Differentiation in Gas Security of Supply Governance 
High energy prices, the occurrence of regional supply shortfalls and first of all, the increasing reliance 
on imports from third countries is reason for unsettling concern. In fact, it is anticipated that by 2030, 
up to 70 % of the EU’s natural gas consumption would have to be imported.
104 Notwithstanding such 
anticipation and the likely or unlikely associated consequences, European regulation addressing gas 
security of supply is not abundant. Security of gas supply policy basically happens at the national 
level. The different domestic preferences are embodied in the gas contracts and political preferences 
which are the prerogative of the Member States.
105 The actually existing EU energy policy in this area 
is comprised of a visible internal market policy and, at this stage, a vocal but inconsistent common 
supply security policy.
106 The main challenges to such a policy at European level are political, both 
internally and externally. The reluctance of Member States to accept the idea of pooling their gas 
markets has been so strong that efforts to obtain their consent was doomed to fail for many years. The 
first success only occurred in 1998 with the creation of the directive on common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas.
107 This pooling together being a new phenomenon, attention was however 
exclusively centred on securing an efficient and well-functioning internal energy market in the 
expectation that such a market would eventually lead to a secure framework for energy supply.
108 It 
was the initial Loyola de Palacio’s push for a security of supply directive, adopted in April 2004
109 that 
finally brought the change. The British U-turn at the Hampton Court European Summit in October 
2005, after the governments had so far resisted all initiatives to co-ordinate energy policy at European 
level, as well as the first Russia-Ukraine
110 gas dispute, also played a role.
111 The most recent trigger 
for the renewed interest has of course been the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 2009 that revealed 
several shortcomings of the existing legislation. The new Treaty provision on energy Article 194 para 
1 lit (b) introduced by the Lisbon Treaty continues along the same lines of the institutional fine-tuning. 
Down to the present day the issue of (gas) security of supply went through a gradual legislation of EU 
energy policy: from a collection of general per definitionem “non-energy” provisions, such as those on 
the internal market (ex-Article 95 EC), on competition (ex-Article 81-88 EC) or on trans-European 
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networks (ex-Art 154 EC) to a finally explicit provision for the energy sector including security of 
supply which invites the EU explicitly to establish those measures necessary to achieve security of 
supply.  
Due to the heterogeneous energy situations of the Member States and the fact that each Member 
State government refers to security of supply considerations when taking decisions on the national fuel 
mix, it is unlikely that the EU will be able to develop a coherent common policy on obtaining secure 
energy supplies in the near future.
112 In order to meet the multitude of interests, differences in energy 
dependence and energy mix and to overcome the complexity of decision-making in this area, a new 
decision-making framework could be established by means of differentiation that would allow 
progress to be made by those Member States that are able to agree on common actions with regard to 
natural gas supply. Such an approach should be particularly considered for the gas sector as it is, due 
to the nature of the product and the method of its transportation, essentially a regional market. 
Concrete examples for illustrating the legal feasibility of an inter se agreement in the field of natural 
gas supply may be drawn from the following areas.
 113 
•  Mutual transparency commitments as regards actual use of existing gas pipes and storage 
•  Common concept of emergency (emergency plans/ solidarity mechanism) 
•  A common supply framework agreement/ speaking with one voice. 
1. Mutual Transparency Commitments  
a. Content of the Proposition 
In order to permit regulators and all market participants to behave rationally a minimum of 
transparency of the industry operation is needed. It has to cover the actual use of the existing gas pipes 
as compared to their commercial booking as well as the actual level and actual use (net change) of 
storages. A partial agreement could contain requirements for aggregating this data at the regional level 
which should help releasing of information, enhancing the relevance of the released information and 
therefore would be influential with regulators and market participants.  
This area of supply security policy is afflicted with problems of disharmonized and uncoordinated 
transposition due to the significant discretion (also temporal) of the Member States with regard to 
translating the respective provisions into national law.
114 In 2009 the Commission had already to 
launch infringement proceedings against 21 Member States for failing to comply with the 2003 
legislation on the internal market for natural gas. Key violations identified were inter alia a lack of 
transparency, insufficient coordination, and the absence of regional cooperation. The average time 
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taken to process such cases can be 28 to 35 months leading to serious leads and lags.
115 The Lisbon 
Treaty will not change much as the future legal instruments for the implementation of energy policy 
goals are to be enacted through the ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 289(1), 294 TFEU), hence 
regulation by means of directives will continue to prevail.
116  
b. Legal Assessment 
Transparency understood in the above mentioned sense falls under the competence in Art 194. Being a 
shared competence, it first needs to be assessed whether there is an occupation of the field by Union 
legislation.  
The existing transparency requirements in national markets are already very broad, e.g. Art 19 (and 
the Annex) of the 2003 Internal Market Gas Directive (even though Art 16 and 27 are restrictive 
somehow). The related powers of the regulators are also very broad, see Art 41 Gas Internal Market 
Directive. The respective powers of ACER as introduced by the “rd package are also comprehensive.  
In addition, Art 44 of the Directive contributes indirectly to transparency. There is furthermore Art 
8(6) of the Gas Regulation which gives power to ACER to get network codes exactly on these issues 
(or even new Guidelines under Art 23 of the Gas Regulation). As a result, it does not appear very 
legitimate to agree on a preliminary agreement on transparency because it will be in place sooner or 
later provided by ACER. Moreover, the Commission is currently examining a possible legislative 
initiative in this area in 2010 and has launched the procedure to adopt a decision amending the 
transparency guidelines annexed to Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. Proliferation of the field does not 
stop even here.  
2. Common Concept of Emergency (Emergency Plans/ Solidarity Mechanism) 
a. Content of the Proposition 
A common European concept of emergency does not exist. The Commission’s 2009 Assessment 
Report of the Directive states the different ways and definitions to ensure a Member State’s self-
defined levels of supply security.
117 The particular look at the relevant 2004 Directive on gas security 
of supply discloses many shortcomings, as it is long on generalities and policies but short on effective 
detailed regulation.
118 In addition, contrary to the internal market Directives, in this case even no 
infringement proceedings were opened for its non-implementations.
119 The 2004 gas security of supply 
directive tried to establish a crisis management mechanism.
120 However, under the fierce and heavy 
pressure of Member States the idea was reduced to Member States having the prerogative to define 
their respective energy policy and to choose their respective mix of energy sources while being aware 
of the risk of gas supply, plus to mitigate such risks in the context of their national energy policies. It 
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ended with Member States having countless unchecked and non-cooperative options.
121 The 
organization of an emergency frame by those Member States participating in the envisaged agreement 
in the form of defining national emergency plans, checked by the regulatory authorities for their 
consistency at the regional level is considerable. It would be checked if market operation rules 
permitted markets to play their role of “first line crisis mechanism” which requires a minimum level of 
operation transparency and a minimum level of harmonisation among countries, regulators, hubs and 
TSOs. The definition of a solidarity mechanism could be used at the regional level among the 
participating Member States alongside with common regulations on how it will be financed ex ante 
and paid on use.
122  
b. Legal Feasibility 
The projected establishment of emergency plans by means of an inter se agreement meets the same 
obstacle like the projected transparency mechanism: there is a broad occupation of the field by EU 
law. Subject to an area of shared competence, field occupation leads to a limitation of the Member 
States’ treaty-making competence with regard to emergency plans. The still valid 2004/67 Gas 
Security of Supply Directive already contained in its Art. 8 the obligation for the Member States to 
prepare in advance and publish national emergency measures, it provided for the adoption and 
publication of national emergency provisions. Even though the established mechanism has proven to 
be insufficient in the event of a supply crisis in 2009 this does not change the extent of field 
occupation. The inefficient results were caused by non- or uncoordinated harmonization across the 27 
Member States. Despite this, the new Regulation repealing the 2004 Gas Security Directive which is 
expected by mid 2010
123 provides for a detailed content of the emergency plans of the Member States 
and the Commission will be equipped with broad powers. The content of the plan is detailed in the 
proposal and includes inter alia a definition of the role of each of the relevant parties, the procedures 
to be followed in the event of a crisis and inter-State cooperation mechanisms. According to Art. 9 (1) 
and (2) of the proposed regulation, three crisis levels are established: “early warning”, “alert” and 
“emergency”.  
The emergency level for EU action is reached “when an exceptionally high demand occurs or when 
there is a disruption of the supply through or from the largest infrastructure or source and there is a 
credible risk that the supply standard to protect customers can no longer be met with market based 
instruments alone”. The Commission can verify "whether the declaration of an Emergency is justified 
and whether it does not impose an undue burden on the natural gas undertakings and on the 
functioning of the internal market". It can ask the competent authority to modify or even lift the 
measure in the event that it imposes an undue burden or is unjustified, Art 9(6). Moreover, the 
Commission may even declare a Community emergency at the request of one competent authority, 
specifying the geographical scope of the measure. Its primary task is to coordinate the actions of the 
competent authorities, in which it is to be assisted by the Gas Coordination Group Art. 10 (1). 
The same applies with regard to the establishment of a common solidarity mechanism at regional 
level. The current 2004 Directive already dealt with Member States cooperation
124 and the expected 
2010 Regulation explicitly provides for a specification of Member States solidarity in applying this 
principle in times of crisis. Supply crisis is defined as a situation where the necessary volumes cannot 
be obtained in the internal market. Thus, Member States’ solidarity is not only required in the event of 
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a supply crisis understood as a short-term transportation failure but also understood as a market 
failure. It cannot even be excluded that solidarity also encompasses cases of failed negotiations with 
exporters (see Art. 3 No. 2 of the proposed Regulation “the Member States shall cooperate with each 
other to prevent supply disruptions and to limit dangers in case it occurs”).
125 Based on solidarity the 
Member States or the EU will take a part of the burden caused by a supply crisis either directly by 
purchase of volumes or transportation capacity, or indirectly by aid to needy Member States or 
compensation of third parties.  
All efforts to enhance security of supply policy at European level need to bear in mind that the EU 
has no responsibility for the availability of goods on the market, thus not for adequate gas supplies.
126 
This lies only with the Member States according to their constitutions. Even with the new energy 
provision, security of supply is only an aim for the internal market rules and not a responsibility of the 
Union. Article 122 TFEU (ex Article 100 EC) on undertaking activities at the time of the shortage of 
supply, only provides for regulations that can come into play only when the internal market has 
collapsed or is about to collapse.
127  
Thus, the existing and nascent legislation pre-empts any agreement falling within their scopes. The 
Member States are precluded from concluding agreements containing conditions that are more 
restrictive than those laid down there, or which are even more detailed or in any event different. 
Moreover, pre-emption occurs here because the envisaged regulations purporting to implement EU 
regulations would even introduce additional conditions (obstacle pre-emption). 
3. A Common Supply Framework Agreement  
a. Content of the Proposition 
The external dimension of gas security of supply has been only recently touched upon by the Union 
institutions.
128 It is characterized by a disparate hierarchy of objectives in various hard law and soft 
law measures. Some of the most important proposals are in the soft law measures what basically hint 
at the creation of an efficient external policy. The competence to deal with the externalities of gas 
security remains largely with the Member States. A main point of concern with regard to the external 
dimension of gas security of supply is that it is imbued with the prevalence of bilateral energy deals 
between Member States and third party countries. Such practice presents some serious drawbacks for 
the EU as a whole. It leads, first of all, to the inability of the EU to “speak with one voice”, thereby 
weakening the negotiating position of the Union versus key producer countries.
129 Moreover such 
agreements may be counter-productive in terms of competition distortion, trade deflection as well as 
for improving the overall EU’s security of supply policy.
130 Particularly with regard to the external 
dimension of securing gas supply the persisting internal market approach as sole policy tool proved to 
be insufficient. It is no coincidence, that recently increasing clamour of failure put in question the idea 
of competitive markets. Meanwhile, security and reliability of energy supply concerns seem to 
                                                      
125 A. R. Boerner, “A critical evaluation of the new proposal for an EC gas supply security regulation”, 7 OGEL 2009, p. 23. 
126 Börner, above note 7, p. 29. 
127 Which in our case of market areas fully integrated by infrastructure would be a total collapse, see R. Börner, above note 
7, p. 26. 
128 Only in 2007, see the energy package of the European Commission and the Communication “An Energy Policy for 
Europe”, COM (2007) 1 Final.  
129 Similar argument in Open Skies, Opinion of the AG, paragraph 64.  
130 H. SCHMITT VON SYDOW, Wilton Park Conference on “A Smart EU Energy Policy”, Dec. 2009. Nabucco depends 
on a number of factors coming together all along the line (upstream supplies, downstream markets, licensing, financing 
agreement etc). Deals proposed by Gazprom to Austria's OMV, Hungary's MOL, and Italy's Eni, could each have the 
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supersede the desired effects of market efficiency.
131 In fact, reconsideration of the gas market 
liberalisation policy, insofar as it works against security of supply, is demanded.
132 It is not an accident 
that possibilities of setting up buying consortia and/or a “gas purchasing group”
 133 made their way 
onto the European agenda. One example is the “CDC” approach of the Commission as suggested in 
the Second Strategic energy review. This is an approach which might run counter the EU competition 
rules, Art. 101, 102 TFEU. 
Negotiations with the gas producing countries mainly take place on a bilateral basis, in an 
uncoordinated manner fully focused on the national interest.  Transparency in this area is lacking 
almost completely. The Member States make bilateral deals with major energy suppliers without 
informing the Commission or the other Member States, thereby putting the cohesiveness and the 
credibility of the EU energy external policy into question.
134 This lack of transparency inside the EU is 
also used by third party countries against the EU, in particular with respect to the pricing of gas in 
different EU Member States. Unlike with the signing of particular bilateral deals with the USA on air 
transportation access (‘open skies), the EU has not mounted any legal challenge against the Member 
States and has not yet asked the European Court of Justice to step in, which however remains a 
possible way forward for the Commission.
 135  In order to secure gas supply the establishment of a 
coherent approach among Member States towards major supplier countries is needed a “common 
voice” i.e. a coordination and information mechanism for bilateral actions, arrangements and contracts 
based on a high level of transparency. 
b. Legal Feasibility  
With regard to the external dimension, the situation is difficult for a Schengen-like approach 
understood as an agreement among Member States as we touch upon exclusive competences of the 
Union. Generally those cases where the Union can act externally derive either explicitly from the 
treaty, are implied from those provisions or derive from secondary internal legislation based on those 
provisions.
136 If we look at the usual bilateral energy agreements concluded between Member States 
and third countries at least some of the aspects covered are the exclusive competence of the EU. In 
fact, the Union (and pre-Lisbon: the Community) possesses the external competence to “speaking with 
one voice” which covers the conclusion of agreements with third countries.
137 Relevant policy on the 
matter is on the one hand the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of Article 207 TFEU (ex 133 EC 
Treaty).
138 It provides for a coherent external trade regulation at EU level. The CCP does not only 
                                                      
131  A. Sastri, Comment on “A French rethink of the Gas Market” 10. March 2010. Available at: 
http://www.europeanenergyreview.eu/index.php?id=1772. 
132 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the Europea 
133 See the recent proposals by the French Government, C. Stoffaes. 
134 H. SCHMITT VON SYDOW, Wilton Park Conference on “A Smart EU Energy Policy”, Dec. 2009. 
135 It is visibly a matter for political judgment by the Commission whether to take action in such cases. However, in recent 
times it has done so in other areas See C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805; C-433/03 Commission 
v Germany [2005]  ECR I-6985 (Inland Waterways Agreements); C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, pending (AG 
Maduro  opinion 1 October 2009); C-13/07 Commission v Council (WTO –Vietnam accession), opinion of AG Kokott, 
26 March 2009. Demonstrates the complexity of interpreting the effects of pre-Lisbon Art 133. The  following cases are  
all on Art 307 EC, AG Maduro relied also on Art 10 but the ECJ did not: C-205/06  Commission v Austria (BITS), 3 
March 2009; see also C-249/06 Commission v  Sweden (BITS), 3 March 2009;  C-118/07 Commission v Finland 
(BITS), 19 November 2009. 
136 S. Haghighi, “Energy Security and the Division of Competences between the European Community and its Member 
States”, European Journal, 2008, p. 464. 
137 H. SCHMITT VON SYDOW, Wilton Park Conference on “A Smart EU Energy Policy”, Dec. 2009. 
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stand for the coordination of national policies or an obligation to cooperate with the Member States, 
but as a task of the Union. However Member States rarely hesitate to foster an autonomous 
commercial policy despite the competence of the Union. Pre-Lisbon, this Union exclusive competence 
was limited to trading in goods. In other areas such as investments, the provision of services or when 
non-trade matters were involved, the competence was shared and thus both the Community and the 
Member States were allowed to conclude agreements.
139 One illustrative example is the amendment of 
the trade-related aspects of the Energy Charter Treaty in 2001.
140  
In practice most energy-related agreements have been mixed with the consequence that they had to 
be concluded by the EC and the Member States since they naturally contained elements which 
encompassed shared competence, including services, establishment and investment/capital (examples 
include the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Community Treaty).
141 The difficulty was 
distinguishing trade in goods (imports of oil, natural gas and coal being then already covered) from 
services (gas services).
142 The Lisbon Treaty now indicates explicitly that the area of CCP in its 
entirety is exclusive. It is a major simplification compared to the complexity of the former provision 
and has important consequences for the Member States as they are excluded from adopting 
international treaty in this area, a clear case of pre-emption.
143 In addition, the EU even possesses (and 
already possessed pre-Lisbon) an implied external power relevant for the regulation of the EU external 
energy relations, which is now, after having been progressively developed by the ECJ, codified in 
Article 3 TFEU.
144 The reform Treaty codified the “implied external powers”, i.e. if there is an internal 
                                                      
139 Definition of services see S. ZARILLI, “Energy Services in International Trade: development Implications”(2001) 8 
Dundee University Online Journal, Article 15: Services in the energy sector appear in two categories: the traditional 
services related to oil and gas exploration, drilling services, derrick erection, re-gasification services, refinery services as 
well as and pipeline buildings. Those services arising from the break-up of integrated energy systems and the 
introduction of competition and privatization in this sector, e.g. operations to the power pools, the provision of 
continuous information on energy prices, energy trading, and brokering, energy management, reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions, and trading of emission rights are referred to as the emerging services. Apart from exploration and 
production, services of transmission and distribution through pipeline or LNG also exist in the natural gas sector. Except 
of coal mining which includes services, coal is basically treated as a good as most aspects of its trade relate to trade in 
goods. For electricity one finds its generation, transmission, distribution and supply which are services. 
140 It was done simply by Council decision based on Article 133 EC Treaty with a reference to the Community's exclusive 
competence in the preamble (see Dec 2001/595/EC). 
141 Although the post-Nice version of Article 133 EC Treaty referred to services, this competence was not exclusive. 
142 In Opinion 1/94 the ECJ had indicated that the competence of the Community to conclude agreements with regard to 
trade in services only fell in the field of CCP as far as cross-border provisions of services were at stake without any 
movement of natural or legal persons since this was similar to cross-border trade in goods and thus the external 
competence in CCP only covered what is called under the WTO agreements ‘Mode 1’ of service provisions. Mode 2: 
consumption abroad of services by a consumer of another country; Mode 3: commercial presence of foreign service 
providers in a country; Mode 4: movement of natural persons providing services were not covered. The Nice Treaty 
extended the scope of the CCP, with respect to the negotiation and conclusion inter alia to trade in services, ex Article 
133 (5) EC Treaty. See J. WOUTERS, D: COPPENS, B. DE MEESTER, “The European Union’s External Relations 
after the Lisbon Treaty”, in S. Griller, J. Ziller, The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional 
Treaty? (Springer 2008), p. 142 (170).  
143 Agreements as regards “changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and 
service, the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping 
or subsidies. They will only be enabled to act “if so empowered”. Nevertheless, similar to the EC Treaty, the Lisbon 
Treaty also does not explicitly define the scope of trade in services, thus it is unclear whether it includes the broad 
meaning given by the GATS or instead, the narrow in the EC treaty which excludes commercial presence. 
144 The reform Treaty codified the formerly progressively by the ECJ developed “implied external powers”, see Article 3 (2) 
TFEU (such competence may be either exclusive or shared) which is 1) as a result of the 'AETR' case law - in cases 
where internal rules were already adopted in a particular field (which makes it necessary to compare the already existing 
Community rules with that of the energy deal at issue in order to determine the extent of the coverage); 2) Whenever the 
Community has included provisions in its internal legislative acts relating to the treatment of nationals of non-member 
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competence there is also an external competence of the Union. These implied powers are also 
exclusive, thus exclude the Member States from acting, when the conclusion of the projected 
agreement is provided for in a legislative act of the Union, Art. 3 (2) TFEU. Having an area where a 
possible agreement would not solely involve issues that fall within shared competence but also within 
the exclusive competence of the EU, the Member States are prevented from concluding a Schengen-
like agreement even if the Union has not exercised its powers to set up a common policy in the area.
 145  
How to determine what exactly belongs to the Union’s power if we look at the conclusion of 
energy agreements with third countries? And what is still left to the Member States?
146 The open skies 
cases are good examples for proving that the limits of competences are anything but clear-cut. The 
bilateral agreements at issue were fairly complex agreements, dealing with a variety of issues, ranging 
from aviation security to adoption of a computerized reservations system, from licensing to fares.
 147 
The situation is similar for the energy deals. Most of them are supported in some way by an 
intergovernmental agreement or understanding, and thus are not purely commercial. Moreover, due to 
the gradual expansion of Union competences with regard to the externalities it seems impossible to 
find scope for a Member States’s inter se agreement. What might look like a shared power may turn 
out to instead rest with the Union.  
4. Conclusion 
Looking at the jurisprudential groundwork undertaken, the establishment of a new institutional 
framework alongside EU law in order to enhance cooperation in gas supply security with regard to 
transparency and a common solidarity and/or emergency mechanism is legally not feasible due to pre-
emption of the field by Union law. Since the external side of gas supply security involves matters that 
are in the scope of the Union as well as the Member States an alternative could be a mixed-agreement, 
i.e. an agreement entered into both by the EU and the Member States.
148 It could create a partnership 
between the Union and at first a number of willing Member States seeking cooperation to exercise 
powers in the field of gas security of supply. Incentive for such an agreement could be inter alia to 
avoid a further expansion of the Unions competence as it has happened based on the implied external 
competences doctrine by the ECJ and might now go on under the Lisbon Treaty. Although until now 
the competences to deal with the non-market aspects of energy security have remained still largely 
within the hands of the Member States, the observable expansion of the internal regulatory power of 
the Commission is able to gradually spur the involvement of the Union at the external level.
149 
Another alternative is given to create a new gas Treaty based on the same model like EURATOM 
which is an example of an instrument where the competencies have been clearly identified and 
defined. It explicitly recognizes the competence of the Community to establish with other countries 
(Contd.)                                                                   
external competence in the spheres covered by those acts; 3) if it is necessary to conclude an agreement with at least one 
third party country in order to achieve the objective related to internal measures. 
145 In the very classic Kramer decision, the Court held that the Member States would be free to keep on exercising their own 
residual powers until the Union started to exercise its powers. In case the Community had an exclusive power to set up a 
common fisheries policy, including external action. That implies that the Member States may seem free to act, but are 
not, in that their actions including the conclusion of agreements with third parties can only take place by the acquiescence 
of the Union; they act on borrowed time. Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Kramer [1976] ECR 1305. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl&lang=en&lng1=en,de&lng2=da,de,en,fi,fr,it,nl,sv,&val=53705:cs&page=1&hwords
=Kramer%7E.  
146 J. KLABBERS, “Treaty Conflict and the European Union”, (Cambridge: 2009), p. 117. 
147 Therefore, throughout the open skies saga, at least four legal bases for the exercise of an exclusive power of the 
Community were invoked, which already suggests that the situation is far from clear Two regular treaty provisions, 
Article 133 TEC and Article 84 TEC, the 1/76 doctrine and the ERTA doctrine. 
148 J. KLABBERS, “Treaty Conflict and the European Union”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 188. 
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relations which aim at fostering progress in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
150 On this basis the 
Community is entering into a growing number of international agreements with third countries and is 
strengthening cooperation with international organizations. In addition, the EURATOM Treaty 
provides that the common supply policy for uranium should, where appropriate, be ensured within the 
framework of agreements concluded between the Community and third countries.
151 However, such a 
solution is subject to several uncertainties. Even though it appears very promising to create a new 
supranational body such as e.g. the EURATOM Agency, it does not seem politically realistic, 
particularly in view of the remaining reluctance of the Member States to transfer any more powers 
related to energy regulation to the EU institutions and looking at the recent experience with ratifying 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
V. General Conclusion 
This article has presented a preliminary assessment of the legal feasibility of Schengen-like 
agreements for EU energy policy. We have found no general answer and diverging results according 
to the area analyzed.  
In the area of nuclear policy, several of the most important licensing issues could be fruitfully 
integrated in an inter se agreement. The licensing process concerns a wide range of issues such as 
reactor design certification, early site permit, construction permit, operating licenses or combined 
licenses, and of course security and safety standard. A deeper cooperation of nuclear regulators in new 
licensing issues is possible in the short-term. Some initiatives of these regulators already exist, as the 
Multinational Design Evaluation Program, which shows the relevance and timeliness of the issue. 
Common changes and harmonization of the regulatory and licensing legal framework could occur 
quickly if a few Member States could agree on an inter se agreement. A number of EU countries 
considering new build have already taken steps to adapt their framework, for instance Italy and the 
UK. Such steps should be coordinated and best practice examples should be followed. More efficient, 
more predictable and more harmonized licensing regimes are vital for investment decisions. Given the 
very particular and contentious nature of the nuclear technology, a legally-binding cooperation device 
could be useful. 
The internal dimension of gas security of supply is an area which is exhaustively covered by EU 
legislation. Even though it would be beneficial to establish transparency, emergency or solidarity 
mechanisms at a regional level, the comprehensive regulation at EU level pre-empt the Member States 
from concluding inter se agreements in this area. Of course deeper regional cooperation is possible in 
the lose frame of regional initiatives. With regard to the external dimension a Schengen-like 
agreement excluding the EU will not be possible as the objectives to be regulated touch upon areas of 
exclusive Union competence. As a consequence only a so-called mixed agreement appears to be the 
best possible solution. Such a solution outside the EU institutional framework would in addition give 
the Member States a possibility to limit a further expansion of the EU’s external competences (as 
developed gradually by the ECJ and now constitutionalized with the Lisbon Treaty).  
As a general result, Schengen-like agreements are not legally feasible in every area of EU energy 
policy. The actual legal feasibility depends on the development of Union law which in turn often 
depends on the willingness of Member States to transfer competences at the Union level. This sets the 
limits and also the opportunities for such agreements. Overall, such inter se agreements seem to be the 
right sort of legal framework in certain targeted areas of energy policy where we would like to see a 
more European policy to go forward.  
                                                      
150 See Articles 2 (h) and 101 of the Euratom Treaty.  
151 See Articles 52 and 64 of the Euratom Treaty.
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Finally, even if the primacy of EU law might be an insurmountable obstacle in some areas of 
energy policy where the legislation is already comprehensive, the current political realities might act 
as a facilitator for the implementation of inter se agreements. The unification of energy law is indeed 
an inherently political subject and any attempt by the Commission to prevent the Member States from 
concluding international law agreements or to fight their legality under EU law might be seen as an 
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